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Based on long-term fieldwork in urban and rural Rwanda between 1997 and 2002
as well as on recent focus groups and interviews conducted in May and June 2007,
this article explores local perceptions of the Gacaca process and asks whether
Gacaca is fulfilling its primary goals to ‘‘end impunity,’’ promote reconciliation,
and establish, in the words of Paul Kagame, the ‘‘real truth of what happened
during the Genocide.’’ The findings indicate that how well Gacaca is functioning
varies a great deal from community to community. The most important variable
appears to be the character of the inyangamugayo (‘‘persons of integrity’’) who serve
as both judge and jury in the Gacaca system. Regardless of how well Gacaca is
operating, in communities where research was conducted, the process has increased
conflict in local communities (or at least brought it to the surface) and intensified
ethnic cleavages in the short term. Since the Gacaca process began its pilot phase in
2001, community-based organizations that had reestablished or built new cross-
ethnic relationships have faced extreme difficulties as other people (both Tutsi and
Hutu) within the community have tried to destroy solidarity across ethnic lines.
Increasing ethnic cleavages in the short term would not necessarily be a negative
outcome if the long-term prospects for building a peaceful society were good.
Unfortunately, given local perceptions of widespread injustice in the Gacaca
process, the latter is not the case.
Keywords: Rwanda, genocide, reconciliation, transitional justice, local justice
The goal of the gacacas was not to parade people before the courts for form, but to try
them well! (Benoit Kaboyi, executive secretary of Ibuka, the National Genocide
Survivors’ Association)
. . . the inyangamugayo won’t stop until all the educated Hutu are in prison with long
sentences. (Woman from Northern province, May 2007)
Fourteen years after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, many genocide survivors and
victims are still awaiting justice, although justice has been sought through a plurality
of mechanisms: an ad hoc international tribunal, foreign courts, the Rwandan justice
system, and a local justice mechanism known as Gacaca. In a radical departure from
precedents in other post-conflict countries, where amnesties, truth commissions,
selective prosecutions, or some combination thereof have been used to bring closure to
conflict, Rwanda decided to put ‘‘most of the nation on trial.’’1 To accomplish this task,
the government reinvented a ‘‘traditional’’ conflict-resolution mechanism known as
gacaca.2 Beginning with a pilot phase in 2001 and a nationwide roll-out in 2005, the
entire population has been enlisted to prosecute, defend, testify, and judge an
estimated 761,000 suspects who stood accused of genocide as of March 2005 and to
hear a total of 1.1 million cases.3
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Based on long-term fieldwork in urban and rural Rwanda between 1997 and 2002
as well as on recent focus groups and interviews conducted in May and June 2007, this
article explores local perceptions of the Gacaca process and asks whether Gacaca is
fulfilling its primary goals to ‘‘end impunity,’’ promote reconciliation, and establish the
‘‘real truth of what happened during the Genocide.’’4 My findings indicate that how
well Gacaca is functioning varies a great deal from community to community. The
most important variable appears to be the character of the inyangamugayo (‘‘persons
of integrity’’) who serve as both judge and jury in the Gacaca system. Regardless of
how well Gacaca is operating in communities where research was conducted in 2007,
the process has increased conflict in local communities (or, at least, brought that
conflict to the surface) and has intensified ethnic cleavages in the short term. Since the
Gacaca process began in its pilot phase in 2001, community-based organizations that
had reestablished cross-ethnic relationships or built new ones have faced extreme
difficulties as other people (both Tutsi and Hutu)5 within the community try to destroy
solidarity that crosses ethnic lines. Increasing ethnic cleavages in the short term is not
necessarily a negative outcome if the long-term prospects for building a peaceful
society are good. Unfortunately, given local perceptions of widespread injustice in the
Gacaca process, the long-term prospects for a peaceful and just society in Rwanda are
not favorable.
The Move toward Local Justice
Since 1994, many justice mechanisms have been used to prosecute the planners and
perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide. The new Rwandan government, headed by the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF),6 adopted a stance of maximal prosecution: every
single participant in the genocide, from the central planners down to coerced peasant
farmers or opportunistic looters, would be prosecuted and punished for their crimes.
Article 2 of the 1996 ‘‘genocide code’’ delineates four categories of responsibility in the
genocide: (1) ‘‘planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of
genocide or of a crime against humanity,’’ persons of positions of authority in the
government or political parties, ‘‘notorious murderers,’’ and ‘‘persons who committed
acts of sexual torture’’; (2) perpetrators or ‘‘conspirators of accomplices’’ of intentional
homicide or physical assault causing death; (3) persons guilty of ‘‘serious assaults
against the person’’; and (4) persons who committed crimes against property.7
Subsequent amendments to this legislation, including the laws establishing the
Gacaca courts and amending their structure and statutes, have maintained this
hierarchy of responsibility, with punishments varying in severity by category.8 Justice
mechanisms at the international, national, and local levels have attempted to
prosecute and punish those responsible. Yet many genocide survivors and victims
still feel that justice is elusive.
On the international plane, the UN Security Council created the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in November 1994 to prosecute persons
responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in Rwanda and in
neighboring states.9 The hope was that the ICTR would allow prosecution of the
genocide planners who had fled the country. The first ICTR trial, that of Jean-Paul
Akayesu, former bourgmestre (mayor) of Taba commune, started in January 1997 and
ended in October 1998. Akayesu was found guilty of nine counts of genocide and crimes
against humanity, including the use of rape as a weapon of genocide, and was
sentenced to life in prison.10 Most Rwandan citizens felt completely marginalized by
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the ICTR in the early years of its existence, but public information campaigns in
Rwanda sponsored by the ICTR, the Hirondelle Foundation, and Internews made
most Rwandans aware of the tribunal’s activities by the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Many Rwandans have followed the progress of the trials via radio news reports,
newspapers, or the Internet; in particular, they were interested by high-profile cases
such as the ‘‘media trial,’’ in which the owners of extremist anti-Tutsi propaganda
newspapers and radio stations were prosecuted, and the ‘‘military trial,’’ in which
several highly placed officers, including Colonel The´oneste Bagasora, were prosecuted.
Yet many Rwandans view the institution as unjust, since people prosecuted before the
ICTR face less severe penalties than those tried inside Rwanda and enjoy ‘‘luxurious’’
prison conditions.11 In addition, both the vast resources invested in the ICTR and its
slow progress have encouraged additional criticism, and the Rwandan government
has, when politically expedient, encouraged negative sentiment toward the ICTR.12
Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, several foreign governments have
attempted to prosecute Rwandans for genocide crimes. The first such case was the trial
of a National University of Rwanda professor and four nuns in Belgium in 2001; all
were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment. More recently, Canada has
prosecuted Desire´ Munyaneza under Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War
Crimes Act, passed in 2000. Munyaneza, the son of a wealthy businessman, fled to
Canada in 1996 or 1997. He was denied refugee status after a series of numerous
hearings and was arrested in 2005 and charged with two counts of genocide, two
counts of crimes against humanity, and three counts of war crimes.13 His trial began in
March 2007; it is still underway, and unlikely to finish before the end of 2008.14
Prosecutions of genocide suspects continue before numerous European courts, and the
Rwandan government has begun to investigate suspects who fled and are living abroad
so that it can request their extradition.15
At the national level, the RPF-led transitional government, along with interna-
tional consultants developed Rwanda’s ‘‘genocide code,’’ promulgated in August 1996,
to govern the prosecution of genocide crimes by the state. The first trials began in
December 1996 and have continued, slowly, up to the present. In the late 1990s, prison
and local jail populations in Rwanda soared to more than 130,000, almost all
imprisoned on charges of genocide. The Rwandan justice system, itself destroyed in the
genocide, which also decimated its personnel, was overwhelmed, and trials moved
forward slowly. As of March 2001, the national courts had tried 5,310 people, according
to Human Rights Watch.16 Even if Rwanda had had the best justice system in the
world, it would have been overwhelmed by the problem of trying genocide suspects.
Under pressure from the international community to solve the problem, the Rwandan
government turned to gacaca, a traditional conflict-resolution mechanism.
In its ‘‘traditional’’ form, gacaca brought together inyangamugayo (‘‘people of
integrity,’’ who were usually respected elders), the parties to the dispute, and residents
of the hill to establish the facts of the conflict and find a solution. Gacaca takes it name
from a patch of grass found in the inner courtyard (igikari) of a traditional homestead.
This inner courtyard was the most private place in the family home and usually only
family members were permitted to enter it; the inner courtyard was the domain of
the wife of the household, and her husband had to ask permission before entering.
Thus, gacaca in its traditional form was a private rather than a public affair.
The deliberations in gacaca were considered confidential, and even the ‘‘judgment’’ or
decisions of gacaca were reported publicly only if such reporting was a specific decision
of the gacaca process.
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Under Belgian colonial rule, tribal courts overseen by local chiefs were established
to handle disputes among the indigenous population, while ‘‘modern’’ Belgian-style
courts were established to handle legal disputes involving the foreign (mostly white)
population. The laws of the colonial state, relegated to the Belgian-style colonial
courts, applied only to Europeans and to certain other categories of foreigners, while
‘‘customary law’’ (relegated to the ‘‘tribal’’ courts) applied to Rwandans and other
Africans. Gacaca continued to operate during this period, but its decisions were
enforced by local chiefs only if these chiefs recognized the legitimacy of a specific
gacaca and its decisions. In the postcolonial period, the Belgian-style ‘‘modern’’ courts
replaced the ‘‘tribal’’ courts; in some communities, however, local administrators began
holding gacaca sessions to resolve disputes among rural peasants without involving
the modern legal system.17 While gacaca was used by local officials under the
Habyarimana regime, the practice was never codified by Rwandan law, so the exact
format and function of gacaca varied widely from community to community.
In addition, families continued to resolve intra-familial conflicts through gacaca
when necessary.
Exactly when gacaca was proposed as a possible remedy for Rwanda’s post-
genocide judicial woes is unclear. In 1996, the UN Human Rights Mission to Rwanda
commissioned a study of gacaca by several Rwandan professors from the National
University of Butare.18 The report documents several forms of gacaca throughout the
country, even finding a few communities where it had been applied to solve local
disputes in the absence of a functioning judiciary in 1995 and early 1996, but
the authors concluded that gacaca was not appropriate as a judicial remedy for
the genocide. Political scientist Timothy Longman dates the gacaca solution to a
conversation between Michele Wagner, a historian of the region and then a researcher
for Human Rights Watch, and some professors from the National University on the
terrace of the Hotel Ibis in Butare in 1995.19 Regardless of the origins of the idea or the
initial negative results of studies, gacaca emerged as the only possible solution in
the eyes of the Rwandan government and many members of the international aid
community, despite widespread opposition from the international human-rights
community. International human-rights organizations have criticized the Gacaca
courts because their procedures violate the fundamental rights of the accused by
prohibiting them from seeking legal counsel and not granting them full rights to cross-
examine prosecution witnesses or to call witnesses for their defense.20 As Peter Uvin
and Charles Mironko state, ‘‘perhaps the strongest element in favor of gacaca is the
lack of an alternative.’’21
In January 2001, the original legislation creating the Gacaca courts was passed by
the National Assembly. The reinvented Gacaca courts changed many of the
fundamental aspects of the traditional gacaca. The first and most important difference
is that the Gacaca courts have made the proceedings a public, rather than a private,
affair, with the entire community participating. Second, the foundation of Gacaca
court proceedings is the testimony of prisoners who have confessed to their crimes.
In traditional gacaca, testimony usually began with the aggrieved stating their case,
followed by impartial witnesses providing testimony. The accused completed the
proceedings by giving their testimony while participants cross-examined them based
on the accounts provided by witnesses. Third, the foundation of traditional gacaca was
not punitive justice but, rather, restorative justice. Although the recommendations
(or ‘‘judgments’’) of a traditional gacaca might have included some punishment
(e.g., the gift of a cow, goat, or other livestock), these punishments were focused on
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reestablishing social equilibrium between the disputing parties and lineages. When a
gacaca judgment included the gift of livestock, such a gift was to be made with all the
attendant ritual ceremony normally accorded to such a gift and with all the subsequent
counter-gifts required for a gift of livestock. The Gacaca courts have attempted to
include aspects of restorative justice through the inclusion of ‘‘work of general interest’’
(a sort of community service) and the payment of reparations to the victims’ families or
to the Genocide Survivors’ Assistance Fund as part of perpetrators’ sentences. Yet, in
the communities where my research was conducted, the perception of the Gacaca
courts is that they are entirely focused on punitive justice. The Gacaca courts can
impose sentences ranging from ‘‘civil reparation of damages caused to other people’s
property’’ to the death penalty or life imprisonment.22
Despite this reinvention of a private conflict-resolution mechanism as a public,
punitive justice mechanism, the Rwandan population, including survivors, the
accused, and families of the accused, maintained hope that the truth might emerge,
justice might be served, and the falsely accused might be released.23 Elections for
inyangamugayo were held in late 2001, and a pilot phase of Gacaca began in 2002.
As a result of the RPF’s policy of maximal prosecution, Rwanda’s prisons gradually
filled following the RPF victory in July 1994. With the return en masse of more than a
million refugees in late 1996 and early 1997, the prison population ballooned, and by
2001 more than 130,000 people were in prison, accused of genocide.24 This massive
prison population put a strain on state resources; the Rwandan government was
unable to provide adequate food, water, or living quarters for prisoners, most of whom
Table 1. Prison Population in Rwanda
Year # Prisoners
1995 57,000a
1996 83,000b
1997 120,000c
1998 126,000d
1999 150,000e
2000 125,000f
2001 100,000g
2002–2005 data unavailable
2006 60,000h
2007 97,000i
a
Human Rights Watch [HRW], World Report 1998 (New York: HRW, 1998).
b
HRW, World Report 1999 (New York: HRW, 1999).
c
HRW, World Report 2000 (New York: HRW, 2000).
d
HRW, World Report 2001 (New York: HRW, 2001).
e
HRW, World Report 2002 (New York: HRW, 2002).
f
Hirondelle News Agency, ‘‘Rwanda Wants to Relieve Congestion in Prisons,’’ Rwanda
Development Gateway, December 6 2007, http://www.rwandagateway.org/article.php3?id_
article¼7543 (accessed 16 May 2008).
g
Ibid.
h
Ibid.
i
HRW, ‘‘Rwanda—Human Rights Overview,’’ in World Report 2008 (New York: Human Rights
Watch, 2008).
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were imprisoned in local, makeshift jails, usually structures originally intended for
other purposes. The family members of prisoners were required to bring food and
drinking water at least once a week to sustain their imprisoned relatives. Gacaca was
the Rwandan government’s proposed solution to the problem of mass incarceration.
In public statements, the Rwandan government expressed its hope that Gacaca
would help with the problem of mass incarceration of people accused of genocide. The
prisons would be emptied and the drain on state and community resources would be
stopped. In early 2003 (a few months before parliamentary and presidential elections),
President Paul Kagame provisionally released several thousand prisoners who were
elderly or sick or who had been minors in 1994. Again in July 2005, August 2006, and
February 2007 authorities provisionally released tens of thousands of detainees who
were elderly or sick, had been minors in 1994; this release also included those or
had confessed to participating in the 1994 genocide and had already served the
maximum sentence for their category of crime.25 Released prisoners attended a six-
week re-education camp (ingando) before returning to their home communities.
Despite these steps to reduce the prison population, Gacaca has resulted in an
exponential increase in the number of accused. Furthermore, the number of detainees
in Rwandan prisons and jails has been on the rise, from 60,000 at the beginning of
2006 to around 90,000 in May 2007.26
Following the pilot phase from 2001 through 2002, the Gacaca statute and the
entire Rwandan judiciary were reorganized based on the results of this phase. Organic
Law No. 16/2004 was promulgated on 19 June 2004, and the Gacaca courts began
operating nationwide in January 2005; the secretary of state of the Ministry of Justice
stated that approximately 761,000 suspects had been identified in the investigation
phase of Gacaca.27 In December 2007, Domitille Mukantaganzwa, executive secretary
of the National Service of Gacaca Courts, announced that 712,723 of a total of more
than 1.12 million cases had been completed.28 Presumably, many of these cases involve
more than one person.
Putting Justice before Truth
A persisting difficulty for Rwandans in general, and for genocide survivors in
particular, is determining when, where, and how their loved ones died.29 Having
stopped the genocide, the RPF has used its symbolic capital as the ‘‘savior’’ of Rwanda
to legitimate its dictatorial rule. Thus, knowing the truth about the genocide is a
political need. Yet, for genocide survivors, this need to know the truth is not merely
political or psychological; it is also spiritual and metaphysical. According to traditional
Rwandan religious beliefs, the dead inhabit our world as ancestor spirits, who cause
trouble for the living if they are displeased. Keeping the spirits happy requires a sacred
burial and regular offerings of food and drink.30 While the majority of Rwandans
adopted Roman Catholicism at some point during the twentieth century, traditional
beliefs still influence the feelings of those who have converted. Furthermore, Catholic
beliefs about purgatory and heaven further emphasize the emotional, psychological,
and spiritual need to honor the dead through proper burials.
Gacaca courts were portrayed as a way to uncover the truth about the genocide.
In some communities, Gacaca has served as a mechanism for establishing the truth.
Anuradha Chakravarty has documented the complex ways in which the logic of
genocide has been deconstructed in some sector-level Gacaca hearings.31 Some sur-
vivors have recovered the remains of their loved ones thanks to testimony given before
the Gacaca courts; others have learned more precisely how, when, or where their loved
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ones were killed. For many others, however, the truth has remained elusive. The
accused were offered reductions in sentences for confessing to their crimes, and
thousands have confessed, but many Gacaca courts are rejecting these confessions as
incomplete or untrue.32 Given the benefits of confession, it is understandable that
some people might confess to less severe crimes than the ones they committed, while
others may have confessed to crimes they did not commit in order to be liberated.33 In
some communities, clandestine groups known as ceceka (‘‘keep quiet’’) have organized
a code of silence before the Gacaca courts.34 Thus, many genocide survivors fear that
the truth will not be restored to them through the Gacaca process.
For the accused, their families, and other Hutu, the fear is that the Gacaca courts
will be used for other ends than justice for the genocide. In some communities,
genocide survivors and others have organized themselves to fabricate testimony and
evidence against certain people.35 In some cases, they appear to be motivated by the
desire for reprisals or revenge—they feel as if they know that certain people were
involved, and they want to make sure that these people are found guilty. In other
cases, testimony is fabricated for other purposes, such as to settle long-term personal
conflicts, family feuds, or disputes over land or other property.
Soldiers recruited by the RPF during the civil war are sometimes behind these
campaigns to denounce people in Gacaca. Between 1990 and 1994, the RPF engaged
in large-scale, clandestine recruitment of Rwandans. This situation generated
mistrust among the population, and extremist Hutu propaganda played on these
fears with such statements as ‘‘the enemy could be hiding anywhere.’’ In his study
of perpetrators, Scott Straus cites these war-related fears as the second most
frequently reported motivation for perpetrators.36 As a result of these fears and
propaganda, the families of RPF soldiers were often the first ones targeted in the
genocide. Today, RPF soldiers whose families were decimated are (understandably)
angry, and many seek revenge through the Gacaca courts against anyone they know
who is Hutu.37
Another problem is that the Gacaca process is perceived as one-sided, as victors’
justice.38 The Gacaca law states that the courts have jurisdiction only over crimes
related to the genocide; thus, killings and other atrocities perpetrated by RPF soldiers,
whether during the pre-1994 civil war, during the genocide and its aftermath in
Rwanda, or in the Democratic Republic of Congo, are off the table. Although the
documentation of RPF abuses committed in 1994 is sparse, several sources report
indiscriminate killings of civilians; extrajudicial executions of suspected or accused
ge´nocidaires; and expropriation of houses, livestock, and other property.39 As the RPF
took control of new areas, it set about separating the civilians from the Interahamwe
zariye abantu (‘‘genuine Interahamwe,’’ meaning those who killed a lot). It relocated
civilians to camps and then executed the Interahamwe. General Paul Kagame
explained the policy on Radio Rwanda: ‘‘harmful elements were hidden in the bushes
and banana plantations. Therefore a cleaning was necessary, especially to separate the
innocent people with the killers.’’40 The RPF called these campaigns of indiscriminate
killings gutwika ahantu (‘‘to set a place on fire’’). When the refugees returned en masse
from Zaire and Tanzania in late 1996 and early 1997, the RPF sorted the Interahamwe
zariye abantu from the other civilians. The notorious Interahamwe (the ‘‘big killers’’)
were often executed on the spot.
As a result of the campaigns to root out ‘‘real Interahamwe,’’ many Rwandan
citizens feel that Interahamwe nyanterahamwe ntizikiba mu Rwanda (‘‘the true
Interahamwe are either dead or in exile’’). Thus, the people accused in Gacaca courts
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are not ‘‘real Interahamwe’’; at best, they are small-time participants who were coerced
into action, and they may be completely innocent.
Many other civilians lost their lives at the hands of the RPF; both Hutu and Tutsi
had something to fear from the RPF, as the soldiers frequently made no attempt to
distinguish between them, presuming that anyone who had survived must have killed
or been an accomplice in the genocide.41 In cases of ‘‘mixed’’ marriages between Tutsi
women and Hutu men, RPF soldiers would sometimes kill everyone to punish the Tutsi
for ‘‘collaborating’’ with (i.e., literally ‘‘sleeping with’’) the enemy.42 Those who have
been victims of RPF abuses or witnessed these abuses, whether Hutu or Tutsi, fear
that the whole truth will not be known.
The Injustices of Local Justice
An important issue that emerged in all focus-group interviews conducted in 2007, and
was mentioned in many other conversations in 2007, is the problem of integrating
released prisoners and ge´nocidaires, meaning those who have confessed to and been
sentenced for crimes of genocide, into the local community. Beginning in 2003, as
mentioned above, large numbers of prisoners were provisionally released, beginning
with the old, the infirm, and those who were children at the time of the genocide,
pending trial in Gacaca.43 Prisoner releases have continued, and, since Gacaca courts
began operating nationwide in January 2005, many of the more recently released
prisoners have been either convicted and sentenced or found innocent.
In preparation for Gacaca, the government waged a public-awareness campaign to
educate both prisoners and the general population about the need to accept released
prisoners, whether innocent or guilty, back into the community. Such ‘‘sensitization
campaigns,’’ as they are called in Rwanda, have a long history and are commonly
employed both by the government and by international NGOs to ‘‘educate the
population’’ or to ‘‘change local beliefs.’’ In the focus groups, I frequently heard various
versions of the ‘‘official’’ response to prisoner releases, that is, the response citizens
were instructed that they should have:
Once they [released prisoners] arrive on the hill, they get along very well. They try to
ask for forgiveness from people whose family members they killed.44
The prisoners had received training sessions in ingando [re-education camp] before
coming onto the hill. You can see, once he [a released prisoner] arrives on the hill, he
has changed a lot. First of all, he prays a lot. You can see that he is truly Christian.
Second, he approaches people to talk and to ask forgiveness from people against whom
he committed genocide, whose family member he killed. Third, he goes to help others.45
I went to visit a freed man at his home who lived really close to my house and he came to
visit me at home too. We have exchanged ideas and I’ve seen that this is someone who
has totally changed. We should have the courage to approach these people. This man of
whom I’m telling you, he killed my family, he asked forgiveness and I forgave him. I find
that it’s good if someone truly accepts these actions and asks forgiveness, at this time he
is relieved and you, too, you feel something like peace in your heart.46
In focus groups conducted in mixed company—that is, those whose participants
included both Tutsi and Hutu widows of the genocide and Hutu wives of current or
former prisoners (in Southern province) or both Tutsi returnees and Hutu women
(in Northern province), the vast majority of respondents were very careful to stick to
this official, idyllic version of prisoner reintegration into local communities. In many
cases, in more private contexts, the very same respondents would recount an entirely
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different version of what was happening. Some women even waited for others to leave
following the focus-group discussion so that they could add to or change what they had
told me.
In more homogenous groups of women, I heard less rosy depictions of prisoner
reintegration. Widows of the genocide (whether Tutsi or Hutu) explained the
difficulties of accepting known ge´nocidaires back into the local community:
In general, the prisoners integrate themselves without any trouble. But, there is one
who came who did not change. He, he stays at home, he talks to no one. Since he did
very bad things in the genocide, killed a lot, we leave him alone like that. We’ve put him
in quarantine.47
We can’t look into men’s hearts, certainly there are those who are happy and others
who are not happy. In general, we pretend to get along.48
The sentiments expressed here are not surprising. It is not hard to imagine how
difficult it must be for genocide survivors to live as neighbors with people responsible
for hunting them, looting and burning their homes, or killing their family members.
What I find striking about the two statements cited above is the subtle differences
in the attitudes behind them. The first was made by one of the key leaders of the
church-based women’s organization of which all the focus group were part. She was
herself an inyangamugayo in the Gacaca court in her sector, and she had courageously
served as an unbiased leader in the Gacaca process by helping to ensure that the
innocent were released and by punishing false testimony. Yet she admits freely that
certain ge´nocidaires do not have the right to rejoin the community, since basabye
imbabazi (‘‘they have asked for mercy’’) before the courts by pleading guilty and
admitting the acts they committed but have not batyicuza (‘‘shown remorse’’). In our
conversations and interviews many Rwandans, whether Tutsi genocide survivors or
Hutu who did not participate in the genocide, drew attention to this qualitative
distinction in the types of confessions made by ge´nocidaires. To confess (gusaba
imbabazi) before the courts, receive a reduction in sentence, and be released from
prison is not the same as accepting moral responsibility and showing remorse
(kwicuza). Both of these Kinyarwanda phrases mean ‘‘to ask for pardon,’’ but gusaba
imbabazi is used primarily in the legal arena, whereas kwicuza is used by Roman
Catholics to refer to asking pardon during the rite of confession.
The second statement was made by a widow of the genocide, speaking in a focus
group made up of two small women’s groupings from a very rural area of Southern
province, the first comprising widows of the genocide and the second, Hutu wives of
prisoners. During the interview the Hutu women hardly spoke and gave very
constrained responses, while the leader of the widows’ group did most of the talking.
Her statement above, especially given that she made it in front of her Hutu neighbors,
was intended to underscore the continuing distrust and suspicion among Tutsi
survivors of the genocide.
In response to a follow-up question, the same widow returned to the same theme by
evoking the lasting trauma (guhahamuka) of genocide:
We cannot forget the wounds that we have in our hearts, but the Gacaca [process] has
warned us to be patient and courageous. If you begin to feel trauma in the Gacaca
[trial], you cannot get anywhere. I can’t forget that I am left alone. When I don’t have
water in the house and night is falling, I think that I should have someone to go
draw water. When there is no wood for the fire, that reminds me that there should
be someone to go and collect wood. When I want this or that, I should have someone
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to help me. With everything that I do, I am reminded that I am alone. That’s how it is,
we go to Gacaca, we try to be patient, but forget all that, it will never happen.49
The fundamental message here is that there can be no justice for genocide survivors.
Whether through Gacaca or any other judicial process, genocide survivors will never
have justice, because the gaping holes in their lives cannot be filled. No one can bring
their dead family members back to life.
While I have encountered these and similar sentiments among survivors over the
years, they are not common to all survivors. Survivors have many different points of
view on the ‘‘events of 1994,’’ on justice, and on the appropriate way to remember the
genocide and their lost loved ones. All have been unanimous that dead family members
can never be replaced or compensated for, but many view justice through the courts
(whether national or international) or through Gacaca as an important duty—a way to
recapture the dignity of those who died in ignominious ways. One widow from
Southern province has collaborated extensively over the years with investigators from
the ICTR and from foreign governments. She has testified before foreign courts on
several occasions, at great emotional cost to herself. Yet she has undertaken all these
activities quietly and discreetly, to avoid attracting attention and potential revenge
seeking. Also, she has not participated or volunteered to participate in investigations
conducted by Rwandan authorities. When I asked her why, she said that she could not
work with these authorities because they ‘‘were not serious.’’
A second issue raised in several conversations and focus group interviews is the
problem of new accusations against people who have been living in the community
‘‘peacefully’’ for the past twelve years. While I was visiting a family in Western
province, the conversation fell on the topic of Gacaca spontaneously. Several neighbors
and members of the patrilineage had gathered in the living room to welcome me, in the
customary fashion, with beer and conversation. The woman with whom I had come
lived in Kigali and rarely came to see her family, so she was catching up on local news.
Her sister-in-law asked, ‘‘Did you know that [name deleted] has become insane?’’ The
others quickly began explaining:
It’s not surprising because we just heard that he, too, killed during the genocide. It’s
someone who was released from prison thanks to the President of the Republic who told
us that. He said that [name deleted] had participated in the genocide. People asked the
freed man why he didn’t say anything sooner.
[Interjection:] He is ready to denounce him and give all the information if the Gacaca
court calls him.50
While this gathering of family and friends was shocked to find out that this particular
neighbor had participated in the genocide, they did not feel that the accusations were
anything other than the truth. For me, it was a relief to see them discussingGacaca and
its complexities without fear and suspicion. The group included (Tutsi) genocide
survivors, (Hutu) former prisoners and family members of former prisoners, (Hutu and
Tutsi) members of the RPF who had joined during the civil war between 1990 and 1994,
and (Hutu) supporters of the late President Habyarimana and his party, the MRND
(National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development). Yet the ties among
them were strong enough to allow for what appeared to be unfettered discussion. The
conversation then turned to the dark side of new accusations of genocide:
Woman: I see that [name deleted, her cousin] has been imprisoned again.
The Others: This gentleman has killed quite a lot of people in the genocide. He
admitted it himself. Only, after he was released from prison, that’s when
he began to lie, denouncing innocent people by saying they had
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participated in the genocide. After he had denounced a large number of
these people, the population realized that he was lying. He, himself,
said, ‘‘No one visited me or ever brought me something to eat when
I was in prison, I will take my revenge.’’ After that, people realized
that these others were innocent. The population is waiting patiently to
see if the inyangamugayo are going to do something and if these people
will be released from prison.51
The foundation of the Gacaca process has been the testimony of prisoners who plead
guilty in exchange for a reduction in sentence and their testimony at the Gacaca
hearings. Prisoners have many motivations to lie. As in the case cited above, some may
lie to seek revenge. The theme of revenge is a very strong one in Gacaca, and its
current goes in many directions, as I discuss further below. Other prisoners may lie
because they did not make a full confession and want to cover up some of the atrocities
they committed in the hope of avoiding longer sentences or more severe punishments.
One effect of new accusations is that they disrupt the social fabric that has been
tenuously rewoven in certain communities. In a focus group in Southern province, a
Tutsi widow explained,
In Gacaca not everything is going well. You see a husband and a wife who have lived on
the hill [and not left] for thirteen years, we believe they are innocent and all of
the sudden you hear them denounced in Gacaca, they did this or that. The family
[the husband and wife] is shocked, discouraged and gets angry saying that this [the
accusation] is motivated by hate. There are interminable conflicts.52
Here the speaker leaves open the question of whether the accusations are true or false;
instead, she highlights the fact that, regardless, the family of the accused perceives the
accusations as injustice, as the seeking of revenge. The belief that accusations are
motivated by revenge is not merely paranoia; such beliefs are based on known cases of
revenge within the community, whether in the immediate aftermath of the genocide,
following the mass return of Hutu refugees from exile in 1996 and 1997, or in Gacaca
itself. The problem here is that the legitimacy of Gacaca has been so undermined in
some communities that residents dismiss all testimony as lies or half-truths.
In conversations and interviews I conducted in 2007, numerous examples of
revenge seeking in Gacaca emerged. These cases appear to fall into three main
categories: revenge against particular individuals, revenge against particular
individuals as representatives of a corporate group, and revenge against a corporate
group.
In instances where people sought revenge against particular individuals, the
events in question had not necessarily occurred during the 1994 genocide. Sometimes
they appeared to be taking revenge for events in the distant past (e.g., during previous
periods of anti-Tutsi sentiment and violence, such as occurred in 1959, 1962–1963, and
1973). Most of these stories are difficult to describe in ethnographic detail because they
risk endangering the tellers who are the victims of this revenge seeking. One Tutsi
genocide survivor, Marie,53 who had been married to a Hutu, Janvier, explained to me
how another Tutsi genocide survivor, Jeanne, constantly terrorized her during Gacaca
hearings. Jeanne would frequently appear before the court and demand that Marie
testify about what had happened during the genocide. Marie insisted that she did not
witness anything, having spent several months in hiding with her children, moving
from house to house among her in-laws, who lived near one another on the hill. Jeanne
insisted that Marie was lying, that she knew where victims’ bodies were buried.
Jeanne repeatedly threatened, ‘‘Don’t you know what the punishment for lying before
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the Gacaca court is!?!’’ As Marie told me her story, her body trembled, her voice
quavered, and tears fell silently from her eyes.
Jeanne and her husband, Patrice (also a Tutsi who had survived the genocide), had
long held a grudge against Marie and her husband. Patrice had been the victim of
Tutsi purges from higher education in 1973, and he blamed anti-Tutsi racism for the
premature end of his education. He eventually focused this anger on Marie’s husband,
Janvier. In the early 1990s, Janvier had been promoted to a leadership position in the
regional government; Jeanne and Patrice believed that Patrice had been unfairly
passed over for the same promotion because of his ethnicity. In the months following
the genocide in 1994, Janvier continued to hold this position in the regional
government and worked closely with the RPA officers stationed in the area.54 One
day, as he was walking on the main road into town, a truck transporting prisoners
stopped; without any explanation, Janvier was arrested by the soldiers accompanying
the prisoners and subsequently imprisoned. It took Marie several weeks to find out
what had happened to him. She eventually found him in a provincial prison. Only
several months later did she find out that he stood accused of genocide, although he did
not even have a judicial file.
With the loss of her husband’s salary, Marie sought assistance for her children
from the Genocide Survivors’ Assistance Fund (FARG), but Jeanne and Patrice, who
headed the local genocide survivors’ organization, blocked Marie’s efforts by refusing
to sign the necessary paperwork. Jeanne said to her, ‘‘The FARG does not help killers’
children.’’ Marie’s husband spent seven years in prison on charges of genocide,
although there was no evidence against him in his dossier. Marie and her husband
believed that Jeanne and Patrice were behind his arrest and imprisonment, but they
had no proof of it.
When Marie’s husband was finally released in 2001, many (Tutsi) genocide
survivors in the community were pleased to see him and welcomed him back home.
Patrice and Jeanne, on the other hand, harassed the family and insisted
that Janvier would be rearrested. On one occasion, Patrice tried to organize a mob
to attack Janvier.55 Under great psychological strain, Janvier went to the capital
city, Kigali, hoping to escape the harassment, but it continued. The family he was
staying with there began to receive anonymous, threatening phone calls; Janvier
became paranoid, believing that he was constantly being watched and followed. One
evening, he was hit by a dump truck while crossing the street. He died from his
injuries. While Marie believed that Jeanne and Patrice had something to do with
the incident, she had no proof, and police investigators labeled Janvier’s death an
accident. Trying to support her children alone, Marie hoped that Jeanne and Patrice
would leave her in peace, but every time she attended Gacaca,56 she faced Jeanne’s
accusations.
The Rwandan government’s genocide commemorations and national mourning
practices generate a polarizing discourse that defines all Tutsi as genocide victims and
all Hutu as genocide perpetrators.57 Under this logic, certain Tutsi genocide survivors
have sought revenge against individual Hutu as a scapegoat for Hutu as a corporate
group.
Among women’s groups in Southern province,58 several of the Hutu members had
faced accusations before the Gacaca courts. In most cases, the association members,
including genocide survivors, had conducted investigations to assess the validity of the
accusations. They then helped the accused group member launch a defense before
the court by locating witnesses and ensuring that the witnesses appeared to testify.
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In a dramatic turn of events, however, one member, a (Tutsi) widow of the genocide,
turned against another member, a (Hutu) widow whose husband had been killed by
RPF soldiers in 1995:
Author: Has the Gacaca process had any negative effects on you or your association?
Woman: We mustn’t lie to you; the Gacaca process has had its negative effects. For
example, our group leader was imprisoned [whispering]. There was an
American researcher who came to interview women in the association on the
topic of Gacaca. In the meeting, D. [name deleted] said that there is injustice
in Gacaca because all the genocide survivors want to make certain that all
the Hutu are imprisoned. After a woman in the association went to see the
inyangamugayo in [sector name deleted] to denounce D., she also wrote a
letter saying that D. had engaged in divisionism. D. was arrested and
imprisoned for four months. Because of the accusations of divisionism, the
case went all the way to the Office of the National Prosecutor in the normal
courts. When D. went before the Gacaca court, our group members went to
testify on her behalf and said that she hadn’t participated in the genocide and
that she hadn’t divided people and that she likes peace in the community.
Afterwards, the Prosecutor also made inquiries. In the end, D. was released.
Author: How has all this affected the association?
Woman: We had some trouble getting along during that period, but T. asked
forgiveness [kwicuza] from all the association leaders and also from D. Now,
there aren’t any more problems. D. forgave T., who is still remorseful. We try
to show T. that there is no problem.59
Despite these statements, it was clear in my interactions with the members of the
association that the story was far from over. D., a vibrant, smiling group leader when I
first met her in 2000, had become a shadow of her former self. She walked with her
head bent, eyes on the ground, and didn’t say a word. The toll taken by her time in
prison was evident in her gaunt face, worried eyes, and white hair. While she was
imprisoned her children had been forced to drop out of school to take care of the family
farm and to bring her food and water. D. did not say a word in any of the meetings
and left the room anytime the subject of her imprisonment and T.’s actions came up.
She avoided having any conversations with me.
In a meeting the following week with all the association leaders, I asked some
questions about Gacaca. After many women said that Gacaca was working well,
a Hutu widow of the genocide stood up and said that there was ‘‘justice for some
in Gacaca, but not justice for all.’’ Immediately, T. stood up and accused her of
divisionism in front of everyone. The meeting became very tense, and everyone was
upset. Several women spoke in rapid succession, interrupting one another. In the end,
a Tutsi widow of the genocide admonished T. for ‘‘restarting her nonsense’’ and told her
that she would be thrown out of the association if she continued.
According to some women in the group, T. was lashing out against D. because T.
had lost her husband and all but one of her children and, in addition, had contracted
HIV when she was raped in 1994. As her health declined, she became more and more
bitter and began to lash out against Hutu association members, even those who were
widows of the genocide.
The statement that had landed D. in prison, that some genocide survivors will not
stop until all Hutu are in prison, was a sentiment I heard in all three provinces during
my visit in May and June 2007. These statements were made only in intimate groups
where everyone trusted those who were listening. As D.’s case illustrates, making
these statements is very risky.
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During a focus group with a women’s association in Northern province, the
members all said that Gacaca was working well, that innocent prisoners were being
released, and that the perpetrators were being found guilty and sentenced. Following
the meeting, a few members lingered to chat. After one member, a (Tutsi) woman who
had grown up in Burundi and returned to Rwanda after the genocide, left, the subject
turned back to Gacaca. The remaining women (all of whom were Hutu) began speaking
in low voices, so that our conversation could not be overheard. They said that Gacaca
was not functioning well at all, that it was ‘‘profoundly dividing’’ the population along
ethnic lines:
Member #1: Before, pastoralists and farmers60 in this region could talk to each other.
In 1998, 1999, and 2000, when conflicts arose between them, for instance,
when someone’s cattle grazed in someone’s fields, we could bring them
together, negotiate, and settle the problem. Since Gacaca has started,
both live in fear. They don’t talk to each other. In front of each other, we
don’t say what we really think. That’s why we couldn’t say what was
really happening [before the Tutsi returnee left].
Member #2: What we see now is that the inyangamugayo won’t stop until all the
educated Hutu are in prison with long sentences.
Author: Are all the inyangamugayo Tutsi?
Member #1: Not only Tutsi, they are fifty-niners.61
Member #3: I was an inyangamugayo. When I saw people giving false testimony and
getting innocent people imprisoned, I denounced it. The other inyanga-
mugayo told me to keep quiet, but I went to Kigali and told them [the
Ministry of Justice] that the inyangamugayo here were not implementing
the law correctly. They sent investigators here. Next thing you know,
someone is denouncing me in Gacaca. I got the message. I resigned, and
I kept my mouth shut. No one sang my name in Gacaca anymore.62
Gacaca has been much touted as a reconciliation mechanism, and, indeed, its
traditional purpose was as a conflict-resolution mechanism. However, as it is currently
being implemented in many communities, Gacaca is deepening cleavages within those
communities and sowing mistrust on all sides. Ibuka, a national association of
genocide survivors, notes the deepening of ethnic divisions in a recent, mostly
negative, report on Gacaca.63
Beyond these injustices and the use of Gacaca for revenge, the process is also being
used by some people to seek other gains. Stories of people denouncing others before
Gacaca in order to ‘‘take their land’’ are rampant in Rwanda; I heard them in all the
communities I visited. The story is so ubiquitous that it strikes me more as a
metaphorical statement about Gacaca and its injustices than as an accurate account
of the usurping of land. Yet in rural Northern province, I encountered very direct
statements about land usurpation tied to Gacaca in a focus group with a women’s
organization in the former Kinigi commune. Since the RPF victory in 1994, a large
number of Tutsi pastoralists have moved into Kinigi with their cattle, which they
grazed on the shoulders of the volcanoes. Between 1999 and 2001, Kinigi was seriously
affected by an insurgency that entered Rwanda from the Democratic Republic of Congo
via Birunga National Park. As part of its counter-insurgency operations, the Rwandan
government forced the population of Kinigi to relocate into internally displaced
persons (IDP) camps; many were forced to destroy their houses, some of which were
modern brick houses with glass windows and metal doors, before moving into the IDP
camp. When I first met this women’s group, they were living in deplorable conditions
in small shelters made of UNHCR tarps, crowded together at the foot of one of the
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volcanoes. Since the end of the insurgency, they had not been allowed to return to their
homes; instead, the government had forced them to settle in an umudugudu
(‘‘agglomeration’’) under its villagization policy.64
In 2007, I tried to meet with the group again, but when my research assistant and I
arrived late for the meeting, the women had gone home. My research assistant
returned a few weeks later to interview the women. When she asked them about how
released prisoners were being integrated into the community, this was the response:
Up until now, we have not yet seen any prisoner releases. On the contrary, many people
are being imprisoned. What we see here is a problem of land holdings. Kinigi is
inhabited by a lot of Tutsi and the fifty-niners want all the land. So, to get the land, the
Tutsi and the fifty-niners who have money, they find Hutu and give them this money so
that they can go and give false testimony. Those that they accuse directly are quickly
put in prison and the others take their land, saying that their grandparents lived in
these places for a long time. The inyangamugayo just discovered this and they said in a
meeting that there are people with big bellies [bafite inda nini, meaning that they are
very poor, greedy, or wicked] and they give false testimony to get people arrested for
nothing just because of money. They warned us not to start that again.65
In other regions I encountered similar stories of people using Gacaca to seek other
gains, whether land or jobs, or to ‘‘settle’’ family disputes by getting someone else
imprisoned. It is not surprising that some citizens are using Gacaca as a lever to get
what they want; this phenomenon has a long tradition in the regular courts, as well as
in other bureaucratic venues. For instance, in his 1968 monograph Pierre Gravel
shows that cases brought before tribal courts were ‘‘trials of powers’’ rather than ‘‘trials
of rights,’’ meaning that a court case was decided not on the basis of whose rights had
been violated but, rather, on the basis of whose power within the community was
greater.66 In my own experience of using the traditional form of gacaca to resolve a
conflict with a neighbor in my rural field site in 2001, I encountered a similar result.
Although the neighbor was found guilty by the hearing and assessed a list of
restitutions to give me, he did not complete any of these tasks. As someone with
kinship ties in the community, a permanent rather than temporary resident, a
genocide survivor with kin ties to the current as well as the former bourgmestre, and a
husband–man (umugabo), he had greater power within the community than I did, so
he was not forced to comply with the decisions of the gacaca. This outcome was a
surprise to no one but me.
Legal Gacaca appears to be operating in much the same way in communities
around Rwanda. In places where inyangamugayo have legitimacy and power within
the community, and when they have the will to carry out trials according to legal
procedures, Gacaca is working well. However, in most places where the inyangamu-
gayo have little or no power, or where the power brokers in the community seek other
ends than fair genocide trials, Gacaca is serving other means and is leading to many
injustices.
The Implications of Injustice
In the short term, Gacaca has destabilized Rwanda and the Gacaca courts have
become arenas where local power relations work themselves out under the guise of
national policy. The central government is well aware of these destabilizing effects. In
early 2007, President Kagame announced that all Gacaca trials should be concluded by
the end of the year; in many communities, Gacaca hearings were held up to three days
a week in an effort to finish by the president’s deadline.67 In some rural communities,
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residents complained that their families would go hungry because they did not have
enough time to tend their fields.68 By the end of 2007, Gacaca trials had concluded in
many communities, but in others the Gacaca courts continued the work to ‘‘close’’ their
files,69 and approximately 77,000 accused of Category 1 genocide crimes still awaited
trial before the formal court system.70 In April 2007, the Rwandan Parliament was
considering an amendment to the Gacaca law to allow prosecution of people accused of
Category 1 genocide crimes by the Gacaca courts.71 It appeared that this amendment
would pass with little controversy; as a result, Gacaca could conceivably continue for
several more years. Many Rwandans view this expansion of the Gacaca courts’
mandate as a source of continued instability and of ‘‘opportunistic’’ accusations and
prosecutions.72
Gacaca has not only deepened the cleavages between Hutu and Tutsi but also
made some Tutsi genocide survivors increasingly mistrustful of the current
government and of the RPF. In December 2007, Benoit Kaboyi, executive secretary
of Ibuka, addressed an extraordinary congress of genocide survivors’ associations and
said, ‘‘The goal of the gacacas was not to parade people before the courts for form, but
to try them well!’’73 Despite growing criticism, including some public comments such as
these, the government of Rwanda has continued to support the policy. In reaction to
statements made by Ibuka, the minister of justice, Tharcisse Kargugarama, vigorously
defended the Gacaca courts, stating that ‘‘all Rwandans should be delighted . . . Those
who see things differently are people that are never satisfied.’’74
Hutu who protected Tutsi during the genocide are facing enormous difficulties. In
Gacaca hearings, their acts of heroism are met with suspicion and scrutinized for
veracity. If they hid Tutsi in their house for days or weeks but then left them behind to
flee the advancing conflict between the RPF and the FAR, they risk being deemed
accomplices to the genocide by the inyangamugayo, especially if those Tutsi ended
up dead.75 Furthermore, they endure discrimination in daily life, where having
connections to power (un piston) is a prerequisite for access to a job. On the other hand,
they face criticism from those Hutu who supported the Hutu extremists and the
genocide: ‘‘We told you they [the Tutsi] would subjugate Hutu as they did under
the monarchy.’’76
If these conditions were short-term problems, Gacaca could, perhaps, still be the
basis for reconciliation, one of the government’s key objectives, as stated in the law
and in speeches by government officials. Unfortunately, given local perceptions of
widespread injustice in the Gacaca process, the long-term prospects for a peaceful and
just society are not positive. Since the Gacaca courts do not have legitimacy in the eyes
of the population, they are viewed as merely another imposition of the central
government on local communities and another venue in which local power conflicts can
work themselves out while appearing to conform to central government policies.
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